J.
Kevin O'Regan
Emeritus
Director of Research
jkevin.oregan@gmail.com
In 2013 I
retired as director of Universit� Paris
Descartes' "Laboratoire Psychologie de la
Perception",
which
studied human
perception in babies and adults. I then pursued a
6-year European Research Council Advanced project ("FEEL")
on the "sensorimotor" approach to consciousness and
"feel". With
a group of 3-8 postdocs and assistants we developed
the sensorimotor theory on five
fronts:
philosophical, mathematical, color psychophysics,
sensory substitution,
and infant development/developmental robotics. We
then continued the robotics/infant work within a
FETopen project called GoalRobots, and a
Pathfinder pilot project called IM-TWIN.
These projects ended in 2022/2023.
I am currently collaborating with Matej
Hoffmann in Prague on a project attempting
to make an icub robot learn the structure of its
body in a way inspired from human infants.
Additionally I'm working on how to use knowledge
about human learning to improve the way current
"transformer" architectures learn.
Download my book on consciousness!
My
book "Why red doesn't sound like a bell" was published
by Oxford
University Press in 2011, and the final draft is
available to
download
in pdf. It suggests a
new way of thinking about consciousness (the
"sensorimotor" approach)
which dispels many confusions and explains the "hardest"
questions about consciousness: namely why sensations
feel like they do
(e.g. why red seems red to us, rather than green, or
rather than
sounding like a bell!), and why sensations have a feel
at all. The
theory is relevant to understanding what would be
necessary for robots
to really feel.
My Past Research
Interests
After doing my first degree at Sussex University and
the
first part of my PhD at Cambridge in
mathematical physics, I switched
my PhD topic to psychology to work on eye movements
in
reading, and moved to the
Centre National de Recherche Scientifique in Paris. My
most
important early work was the discovery of an "optimal
viewing
position"
for
the eye to fixate in words. Recognition is fastest at
that position and
drops off to either side, making it useful for the eye
to fixate there
for efficient reading. From this I developed what I
called a
"strategy-tactics" theory of eye movement control in
reading which
explains why the eye goes where it does in reading. The
idea is that
the eye adopts a general strategy of moving a little to
the left of the
middle of the next longish word, and makes correction
tactics as a
function of ongoing processing if necessary. The theory
is a
compromise between the old "rhythm strategy" theory
according to which
the eye
just plods
along at a fairly constant rhythm without taking account
of what is
being read, and the
(in the 1970's and 80's) fashionable theory according to
which the
eye reacts moment by moment, at every instant
changing where
it
goes as a function of
ongoing cognitive processing.
What
I am most cited for is
change
blindness,
which I discovered with
collaborators
Ron
Rensink and
Jim
Clark. Change
blindness is a
phenomenon where a person looks at a picture of a scene,
but doesn't
see enormous changes that occur in that scene when the
changes are
accompanied by a brief interruption like a cinema cut, a
blank, or
even small distractors like
mudsplashes on a car windscreen. You can see
more demos
below. The phenomenon at first seems similar to the
phenomenon of
"
inattentional
blindness", where
you don't see something that is fully
in view because you are busy attending to something else.
But change
blindness is conceptually a different effect, since it
depends
crucially on the occurrence of a brief transitory event in
the visual
field that distracts your attention, instead of depending
on the fact
that you are consciously attending to
something else.
My Current
Research Interests
Today
my main interest is one particular aspect of the problem
of consciousness,
namely the "what it's
like" of sensory experience: why red seems red to us
rather than
seeming, say, green, or like the sound of a bell, or
even like
nothing at all.
This
so-called "phenomenal" aspect of consciousness is
considered by
philosophers to
be the "hard" problem of consciousness, also known as
the problem of
"qualia". Other questions like the
question of why we have selves or why we can become
aware of things and
use them in our rational actions and thought, are
considered not so
hard. Most theories of consciousness that
neuroscientists talk about
concern the second, "easier" form of consciousness.
Brain mechanisms
like
large scale neural integration, feedback, recurrence or
synchrony of
neural discharges may be able to account for this
"easier" type of
consciousness. On the other hand, many people think
there is a
fundamental obstacle in dealing with the "hard" problem
of
consciousness. There seems to be a kind of "explanatory
gap" between the physical mechanisms of the brain and
the real, nitty
gritty "what it's like" of sensations like red.
My
work on change
blindness and on eye movements has led me to a new way
of thinking
about the "hard" kind of consciousness. In this, I
consider that the
feel of a sensory experience is not something which is
somehow
generated by the brain,
but is rather a quality of how we interact with our
environment. I have
set
out what I call the
"sensorimotor"
theory in various articles, and
have
just finished a book on the subject which should be
appearing in the
next year or so.
The book is for the general public and will
probably have the
title: "Feeling: Why red looks red
rather than sounding like a bell".
The
new theory makes predictions and suggests breakthroughs in
understanding consciousness which I have
been exploring in the last years. Some of this work
concerns what
is called "
sensory
substitution", that is
the possibility of using one
sense (e.g. hearing) to replace another (e.g. vision), and
so, for
example, help the blind to see with their ears. I did this
with
Malika Auvray
during her PhD in my lab.
Some
quite
mathematical
work to test the sensorimotor theory was done for his PhD
in my lab by
David
Philipona and concerns the nature of
color
and space. David's work on
color
is particularly
interesting because it predicts, better than ever before,
well-known
anthropologists' findings about why certain
colors like red and yellow are considered more basic than
colors like
pink and purple. It also explains, better than previously,
exactly
which hues of red, yellow, blue and green seem "pure"
to us.
It
seems to me that this work is getting very close to
answering
the age-old question of why red looks red rather than
green.
David
Philipona's work on
space
is also very fundamental and has applications to robotics.
Other
work done in my lab to test the sensorimotor theory was
done by PhD
student
Aline
Bompas. She confirmed my theory's prediction
that the perceived quality of color should depend on eye
movements.
Finally, most recently with students Ed Cooke and Camila
Valenzuela
Moguillansky we have been looking at the "rubber hand
illusion" and
pain.
Papers to
read and talks to listen to about the sensorimotor
approach
Here is the
slideshow
of the talk on "How to make a robot that feels" that I
gave in Zurich
at CogSys 2010 in January 2010. It summarizes the essence
of my
approach to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, and
includes
material on the sense of self. And here are the videos (
Part
1,
Part
2,
Part
3) of my talk on "Why
red things look red: the sensorimotor approach to
phenomenal
consciousness" given in September 2009 at the Barcelona
Cognition Brain
and Technology Summer School.
My "
magnum
opus" is a
rather long paper setting out the sensorimotor approach
for vision and
visual consciousness in the "peer review" journal
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, where there were 40 replies
from eminent
scientists and my responses to them. Philosopher
Alva No�
collaborated on the paper, but since then he has continued
in a
somewhat different, more philosophical direction.
An
easy to read introduction to the sensorimotor theory of
phenomenal
experience is this slideshow, which is
an expanded
version of a talk I gave at the Association for the
Scientific Study of
Consciousness in Brussels, June 29-July 2, 2000, and
at
Bressanone,
Jan
21-26, 2001.
Another easy paper to read introducing the main
ideas of the theory is
this,
written with
Alva
No�.
My recent work
supercedes the earlier papers by extending the
sensorimotor theory to
understanding the "feel" of all types of sensations, not
just vision.
Several papers on this were written with
Erik
Myin.
This,
this,
and
this
are easy to read and
introduce the concepts of "bodiliness" and "grabbiness" in
order to
explain why there is something it's like, rather than
nothing it's
like, to have a sensory experience.
The sensorimotor theory had its origins in a
old
paper I wrote which is often cited, and where I
claimed that
the visual world is like an "outside memory".
Spongeman's
Sensorimotor
Manifesto
is a wiki for collaborative work attempting to
define as precisely as
possible the terms used in the sensorimotor approach.
Contributions
invited! Why "spongeman"? Because in the sensorimotor
approach, I use
the analogy suggested by my collaborator Erik
Myin
of squishing a sponge in order to explain the "what it's
like" of the
feel of softness.
For a selected list of my papers organized by theme,
see
at the end
of this
website. For my complete publication list see here.
CHANGE
BLINDNESS
DEMONSTRATIONS
(Feel
free to copy these demos but
if you use them in presentations or publications,
please be so kind as
to credit J. Kevin O'Regan and mention my website
http://nivea.psycho.univ-paris5.fr)
Change blindness is a phenomenon in which a very
large change in a picture will not be seen by a viewer,
if the change
is accompanied by a visual disturbance that prevents
attention from
going to the change location. The easiest way to
demonstrate change
blindness is to take a picture, and change some object
in it. If you
view the original and the changed picture in sequence,
but with some
brief visual disturbance like a blank field or
"flicker" in
between
the original and changed picture, the change sometimes
is quite hard
to see:
With
flicker
the
change is hard to see
If you take out the blank field however, then the
change
pops
out immediately:
Without flicker the change is easy to
see
Instead of using a flicker, it is possible also to use
small
disturbances like mudsplashes on a car windscreen:
A
mudsplash also
can mask a big change
You can also get change blindness by making the change
so slow
that attention is not captured by the changing element,
as shown by
this animation by my ex-student Renaud Chabrier. As much
as 1/4 of the picture changes here:
Change
blindness
to a very slow change
If
the change is part of what is the center of interest of
the picture,
attention is more likely to go to that part of the
picture, and the
change is easier to detect, as here:
The
change
is easy to see if it is part of the "Center of Interest"
The
change can also be very difficult to detect if it occurs
in a film
sequence at the moment of a film cut. This is
brilliantly shown by an
ad by the London Transport Office warning that cyclists
can sometimes
be very hard to see if you do not happen to be attending
to them:
Change Blindness in a film sequence
Daniel Simons at the Beckman
Institute in Illinois has made wonderful demonstrations
of this kind of thing occurring in real life. Some
portion of road
traffic accidents may occur because a small, brief
distracting event
(e.g. a windshield wiper or mudsplash crossing the
visual field) masks
a change (like a child running into the street).
Here are some more demos of change blindness, of
varying
degrees of difficulty.
Maoris (mudsplash)
Gunner
(mudsplash)
Street (mudsplash)
Sailboat
(flicker)
Nurses (flicker)
Big Fish (flicker)
Desert Fort (flicker)
Bus (flicker)
Barn (flicker)
Some other change blindness demos:
Flicker
and
mudsplash demos
from
Nature article
and
supplementary info on
Change blindness caused by
"mudsplashes".
Larger
versions
of some flicker and mudsplash movies
Change
blindness
to very slow changes (needs
shockwave plugin).
See
also
the Change Detection
Database, and Ron Rensink's
demos.
INATTENTIONAL
BLINDNESS
Change blindness should be
distinguished from "inattentional blindness".
Inattentional blindness
is a phenomenon in which you are looking at a video
sequence or real
life event, and your attention is so captured by the
task you are
doing that something totally obvious, perfectly visible,
and in
fact, something that you may actually be looking at
directly, is not
noticed. Transport for London has a demonstration of this on youtube.
This demo is actually a copy of an even more striking
"gorilla" demo that
was made by Daniel Simons, which itself was based on an
experiment
performed by Neisser and Becklen. You can find all
this and
more demos
of inattentional blindness on Dan Simons' website,
as well as discussion of the issues involved.
Inattentional blindness is at the basis of one of the
main
causes of
road accidents: people "Look but fail to see" (LBFTS)
some quite
obvious and perfectly visible obstruction in the road.
My collaborator Malika Auvray has made a nice alternative version
of Simon's "gorilla" video. You must track the coin and
see if you
can accurately determine which cup it ends up
under. Only
after
you've done it, read here
Selected
Bibliography
Sensorimotor
approach:
O'Regan, J.K. (2009).
Sensorimotor approach to (phenomenal) consciousness. In
Baynes, T.,
Cleeremans, A. & Wilken, P. (Eds) Oxford
Companion to
Consciousness. (pp. 588-593). Oxford: Oxford
University
Press. [-]
Myin, E., & O'Regan,
J.K.
(2008). Situated perception and sensation in vision and
other
modalities: form an active to a sensorimotor account. In
P. Robbins
& A. Aydede (Eds.) (Ed) Cambridge Handbook of
Situated Cognition. (pp. 185-200). Cambridge:
Cambridge
University Press. [OS]
Myin, E., & O'Regan, J.K. (2007). Phenomenal
Consciousness
Lite: No Thanks! Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
30, 520-521. [ACL] [IF=12.818]
O'Regan,
J.K., Myin, E., & No�, A. (2006). Skill, corporality
and
alerting capacity in an account of sensory
consciousness. Progress
in Brain Research, 150, 55-68. [ACL]
[IF=3.253]
O'Regan,
J.K., Myin, E., & No�, A. (2005). Phenomenal
consciousness
explained (better) in terms of bodiliness and
grabbiness. Phenomenology
and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4), 369-387.
[ACL]
O'Regan,
J.K.,
Myin,
E., & No�, A. (2004). Towards an Analytic
phenomenology:
the
concepts of "bodiliness" and "grabbiness". In
Carsetti, A. (Eds) Seeing,
thinking and knowing: Meaning and self-organisation
in visual cognition
and thought. Dordrecht: Kluwer. [-]
Myin,
E.,
& O'Regan, J.K. (2002). Perceptual consciousness,
access to
modality and skill theories: A way to naturalize
phenomenology? Journal
of Consciousness Studies, 9(1), 27-45.
[ACL] [IF=0.918]
Noe,
A.,
& O'Regan, J.K. (2002). On the brain-basis of
visual
consciousness: A sensorimotor account. In Noe, Alva
Thompson, Evan (Eds) Vision and mind: Selected
readings in
the philosophy of perception. (pp. 567-598).
Cambridge, MA,
US: MIT Press. [-]
O'Regan,
J.K.
(2001). The 'feel' of seeing: an interview with J.
Kevin O'Regan. Trends
in Cognitive Sciences, 5(6), 278-279.
[ACL] [IF=10.981]
O'Regan,
J.K.,
& Noe, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision
and
visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences,
24(5), 939-1031. [ACL] [IF=12.818]
O'Regan, J.K.,
& No�, A. (2001). What it is like to see: A
sensorimotor theory
of visual experience. Synth�se, 129(1),
79-103. [-] [IF=0.477] html
Noe,
A.,
& O'Regan, J.K. (2000). Perception, attention and
the grand
illusion. Psyche: An Interdisciplinary Journal of
Research on
Consciousness, 6(15), No Pagination
Specified. [-]
O'Regan,
J.K.
(1992). Solving the "real" mysteries of visual
perception: The
world as an outside memory. Canadian Journal of
Psychology/Revue Canadienne de Psychologie,
46(3),
461-488. [-] html pdf
Change Blindness
Auvray,
M.,
& O'Regan, J.K.
(2003). Influence of semantic factors on blindness to
progressive
changes in visual scenes / L'influence des facteurs
s�mantiques sur la
c�cit� aux changements progressifs dans les sc�nes
visuelles. L'ann�e
Psychologique, 103(1), 9-32.
[ACL] [IF=0.280]
Blindness
to
scene changes caused by "mudsplashes". by J.K.
O'Regan,
R.A. Rensink,
R.A. & J.J. Clark, in Nature, 398, 34, 1999.
Change
blindness, by J. K. O'Regan, in Encyclopedia of
Cognitive
Science,
Nature Publishing group, in press.
Perception,
Attention
and the Grand Illusion, by Alva No� & J. K.
O'Regan
PSYCHE, 6(15), October 2000
Rensink, R.A., O'Regan J.K., & Clark, J.J. To
see or not to
see: the
need for attention to perceive changes in scenes.
Psychological
Science,
8:368-373. 1997
O'Regan, J.K., Deubel, H., Clark J.J. & Rensink,
R..A.
Picture changes
during blinks: looking without seeing and seeing without
looking.
Visual
Cognition, 7, 1, 191-212, 2000. html
Rensink, R.A., O'Regan, J.K. & Clark, J.J. On
the
failure to detect
changes in scenes across brief interruptions. Visual
Cognition, 7, 1,
127-146,
2000. pdf
O'Regan, J.K. Thoughts on Change Blindness. in: L.R.
Harris
& M.
Jenkin (Eds.) Vision and Attention. Springer, 2001, pp.
281-302. view
Nov.
1, 1999 draft.
Color
Philipona,
D.L.,
& O'Regan, J.K. (2006). Color naming, unique hues,
and
hue
cancellation predicted from singularities in
reflection properties. Visual
Neuroscience, 23(3-4), 331-339.
[ACL] [IF=1.411]
Philipona, D., & O'Regan, J.K. (2008). Reply to
Johnson and Wright. Visual Neuroscience, 25(02),
225-226.
[ACL] [IF=1.411]
Bompas,
A.,
& O'Regan, J.K. (2006). More evidence for
sensorimotor
adaptation in color perception. Journal of Vision,
6(2), 145-153. [ACL] [IF=2.950]
Bompas,
A.,
& O'Regan, J.K. (2006). Evidence for a role of
action in
colour perception. Perception, 35(1),
65-78. [ACL] [IF=1.360]
Space
Philipona,
D.,
O'Regan, J.K., & Nadal, J.-P. (2004). Perception
of the
structure of the physical world using unknown sensors
and effectors. Advances
in Neural Information Processing Systems, 16,
945-952. [-]
Philipona,
D.,
O'Regan, J.K., & Nadal, J.P. (2003). Is There
Something Out
There? Inferring Space from Sensorimotor Dependencies.
Neural
Computation, 15(9), 2029-2049.
[ACL] [IF=2.378]
Philipona, D., & O'Regan,
J.K. (2005). Perception multimodale de
l'espace. In Philosophie de la nature aujourd'hui.
Paris: MSH. [OS]
Philipona, D., & O'Regan,
J.K. (2005). La perception de
l'espace, identification d'une facult� sensorimotrice?
In C.
Thinus-Blanc & J. Bullier (Ed) Agir dans
l'espace.
(pp. 151-165). Paris: MSH. [OS]
"Filling
in" the
blind
spot, visual qualia, and the
theory of the "world as an outside memory"
O'Regan, J.K. Solving the
'real' mysteries of visual perception: The
world
as an outside memory. Canadian Journal of Psychology,
1992, 46,
461-488.
view
penultimate
draft
O'Regan, J.K. The
world as an outside memory -- no
strong
internal metric
means no problem of visual acuity. Commentary in
Behavioural and Brain
Sciences, 1994,17, 270-271.
O'Regan, J.K., No
evidence for neural filling in --
Vision as
an illusion
-- Pinning down "enaction". Commentary on Pessoa,
Thompson &
No�,
"Finding out about filling in". Brain and Behaviour
Science, 21, 1998
Sensory Substitution
Voir
avec
les oreilles: Enjeux de la substitution sensorielle.
by
Auvray,
M. & O'Regan, J.K. Pour la Science, 2003
Auvray,
M.,
Hanneton, S., & O'Regan, J.K. (2007). Learning to
perceive
with
a visuo-auditory substitution system: Localisation and
object
recognition with 'The vOICe.'. Perception,
36(3), 416-430. [ACL] [IF=1.360]
Auvray,
M.,
Philipona, D., O'Regan, J.K.,
& Spence, C. (2007). The perception of space and
form
recognition
in a simulated environment: the case of minimalist
sensory-substitution
devices. Perception, 36(12),
1736-1751. [ACL] [IF=1.360]
Auvray,
M., Hanneton, S., Lenay, C., & O'Regan, J.K. (2005).
There is
something out there: Distal attribution in sensory
substitution, twenty
years later. Journal of Integrative Neuroscience,
4(4), 505-521. [ACL]
Lack of
translation
invariance in vision
Nazir, T.A. & O'Regan,
J.K. Some results on translation
invariance
in the human visual system. Spatial Vision, 1990, 5,
81-100.
Reading
and "optimal
viewing position" in words:
L�vy-Schoen, A., &
O'Regan, J.K. Le regard et la lecture. La
recherche, 1989, 211, 744-753.
O'Regan, J.K.
& Jacobs, A.M. Optimal viewing
position
effect in
word recognition: A challenge to current theory.
Journal of
Experimental
Psychology, Human Perception & Performance, 1992,
18, 185-197.
Reilly, R.G.
& O'Regan, J.K., Eye movement
control
during reading:
A simulation of some word-targetting strategies.
Vision Research, 1998,
38, 303-317.
Nazir, T.A., Jacobs,
A.M., & O'Regan, J.K.
Letter
legibility and
visual word recognition. Memory & Cognition, 1998,
26 (4),
810-821.
view
penultimate
draft
Clark, J.J. and
O'Regan, J.K., Word Ambiguity and the
Optimal
Viewing
Position in Reading, Vision Research, 1998, 39, 4,
843-857.
Gautier,
V., O'Regan J.K. & Le
Gargasson,
J.-F. "The-skipping"
revisited in French : programming saccades to skip the
article "les".
Vision
Research, in press. view
penultimate
draft
Vitu, F., McConkie,
G.W., Kerr, P. & O'Regan,
J.K.
Fixation location
effects on fixations during reading: an inverted
optimal viewing
position
effect. Vision Research, 2001, 41 , 3513-3533.
Visual
illusions
Ninio, J., & O'Regan,
J.K. The half-Z�llner illusion.
Perception,
1996, 25, 77-94.
Read
here
after having watched Malika Auvray's coin video:
Did
you see the green pepper?
Look
at the video again if you didnt.